

How do Regime Divides Emerge and What Happens When They Fade?

Evidence from South America

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Abstract

The military dictatorships of the 1960 and 1970s in Latin America have left lasting imprints on some of the region's party systems. But whereas regime divides have introduced a two-dimensional policy space in some countries, they have failed to manifest themselves in others. This paper constitutes an effort to theorize and then map out these differences. I argue that two distinct paths lead to the emergence of regime divides: Along the first path, an authoritarian regime's economic policy legacy enables actors to interpret the regime question in terms of the established economic state-market cleavage. Along the second path, new parties – authoritarian successor parties on the right or parties on the left that suffered repression under authoritarian rule – politicize the regime divide. In countries that follow the first path, the regime and state-market dimensions overlap, while they tend to cross-cut along the second path. This difference has consequences for the strength and durability of regime divides, characteristics that I explore in a final step of the analysis.

My analytical approach is to construct latent dimensions using elite and mass-level data to locate parties and voters on the economic state-market and regime divides. This allows for an analysis of the presence of a regime divide, as well as its cross-cutting or overlapping nature with respect to the state-market divides. In a second step, I assess the relative strength of the two divides by measuring how strongly they structure voter alignments.

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Introduction

Latin America saw a proliferation of military coups ushering in authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. This phase coincided with a shift from the paradigm of Import Substitution (ISI) to market liberalism. According to O'Donnell (1973), in certain countries it was even the crisis of the preceding model of economic development that triggered the wave of authoritarian regime change. While there was much continuity in party systems before and after the Third Wave of democratization that set in in the 1980s (Remmer 1985; Bornschieer 2019), the authoritarian legacy nonetheless reconfigured the basic dimensions of political space, at least in some cases. This paper addresses the question which conditions make such a reconfiguration likely and how durable it is likely to be where it occurred.

Traditionally, the most important dimension of party competition in South America is the economic state-market dimension (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Collier and Collier, 2002; Moreno, 1999; Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009; Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 2012). The dynamics of party competition and parties' strategic action during and after re-democratization have potentially modified the historical dominance of the economic dimension of conflict, however. There is evidence that regime issues form a competitive dimension that has come to complement the economic cleavage in several Latin American party systems due to the experience of military rule in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Moreno, 1999; Bornschieer, 2013; Roberts, 2016; Hawkins, Kitschelt, and Llamazares 2010).

Although there is little to justify an authoritarian regime from a normative point of view, regime issues may nonetheless be contentious. Some will denounce the repressive character of the dictatorship and the human rights violations citizens suffered from, while others may replicate that the regime restored order in tumultuous times and perhaps brought economic stability. I argue that two paths lead to the formation of regime divides. The first path is

related to the economic policy character of authoritarian regimes. Where coups constituted a reaction to a perceived left-wing threat or where military rulers pursued economic liberalization, the regime divide maps more readily onto the pre-existing economic dimension. After re-democratization, this creates powerful incentives for parties to mobilize along the regime divide due to the *ideational resource* related to authoritarianism that parties can draw on to mobilize voters. Along the second path, authoritarianism leads to the formation of new parties that have opposition to – or support for – the outgoing authoritarian regime in their DNA. Here, the formation of a regime divide is facilitated by these *organizational resources*.

This paper starts out by theorizing and then mapping out the strength of regime divides in those South American party systems that experienced authoritarian rule in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s. Leaving aside the Central American countries for reasons of space, I show that regime divides were important both at the party system and the mass levels in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, while they failed to crystallize in Argentina, Peru and Ecuador. The second argument is that the two paths leading to the contestation of regime issues work distinctively in determining the strength of regime divides. I hypothesize that regime divides tend to be stronger where actors are able to link them not only to human rights violations and repression, but also the economic policies pursued under the authoritarian regime.

The strength of regime divides is also likely to affect how durable they are likely to be as democracy matures and becomes the “only game in town”, as Linz and Stepan (1996) put it. This is because stronger regime divides – those triggered by both by the authoritarian character, as well as the economic policies of a regime – provide actors with two separate ideational sources to draw on. But what happens when regime divides fade? In a more exploratory fashion, I explore whether this results in dealignment and in a loss of party system responsiveness, or whether other conflicts are likely to substitute for the waning of the

regime question. Partially contradicting research arguing that the Chilean party system has lost touch with the electorate, I show that the economic cleavage has compensated for the fading of the regime dimension. A similar process occurred in Bolivia, where few observers have identified a regime divide thus far. The lack of strong programmatic differentiation along the economic dimension in Brazil, on the other hand, renders alignments fragile as the importance of the regime issue recedes. Mexico is different in this respect, both dimensions remain salient or even gain in importance.

The analytical strategy used to measure the presence and the strength of regime divides entails three steps. First, drawing on data from the Salamanca Parliamentary Elites Surveys (PELA) and the Brazilian Legislative Surveys, I analyze to which extent a regime divide is present at the party system level in the eight countries covered in this paper. I then turn to the mass level – employing data from the World Values Survey (WVS), the Latinobarómetro, and the Brazilian Election Survey (ESEB) – to verify to which extent the regime divide also cleaves electorates. Drawing on multiple issue items in the elite and mass surveys, I use Discriminant Analysis to measure latent dimensions that can be compared between the party and voter levels. Third, I combine the data from the elite and mass levels to assess the responsiveness of the party system to voter preferences along the regime divide. More specifically, I introduce a measure that expresses how well individuals' preferences match the policy position of their preferred party. This is my main indicator for the strength of the regime divide. To put the regime divide in perspective, I also measure party system responsiveness along the economic state-market dimension. The empirical analysis starts in the mid-1990s, the first point in time for which both elite and mass data is available to measure party positions and voters' programmatic demands. I replicate the analysis in the mid-2000s to assess the durability of regime divides and their evolving relationship to the state-market dimension.

This paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the two-dimensional space in South American party systems, constituted by the economic and the regime dimensions. It is here that I develop the two mechanisms sketched out above. I then go on to develop expectations in terms of the presence of regime divides, as well as their strength and durability in the eight South American countries covered by this paper. The fourth section summarizes this discussion into three scenarios that result in regime divides of different intensities. In the fifth section, I present the research design and discuss how party system responsiveness – the key variable I use to measure the presence and strength of divides – is measured. The sixth section presents the results pertaining to the prevalence of the regime divide. For those countries where such a divide is present, I then look at its interplay with the economic state-market dimension by taking an in-depth look at the positions of parties and voters in the two-dimensional political space. The final part compares the responsiveness of party systems along the state-market and regime dimensions over time in order to test the hypotheses pertaining to the waning of regime divides.

The legacies of authoritarianism: Party system change and the two-dimensional political space in South America

Competitive dimensions. Latin America displays a wide variation in the degree to which parties are anchored in society and reflect voters' programmatic preferences. Long-term and short-term approaches offer competing explanations for these differences. Kitschelt et al. (2010) present an explanation centering on historical development patterns, where the early formation of welfare states put party systems on a programmatic track by triggering conflicts over the welfare state expansion or the retrenchment. In a somewhat different argument, historical polarization has fostered voters' capacity to identify ideological alternatives, and to

vote – in accordance with the responsible government model – for parties that mirror their programmatic preferences (Bornschieer 2019). The two accounts are similar in that they identify factors that predate the wave of authoritarianism that swept much of the region from the 1960s onwards. They also converge in identifying Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina as cases with much more responsive party systems than others. Accounts focused on the more recent past have emphasized the effects of governments pursuing market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Roberts (2013, 2014) distinguishes between countries where market reforms have reinforced existing alignments along the economic axis, and those where “policy shifts” (Stokes 2001) dealigned party systems. In a similar vein, Lupu (2014, 2016) explains the breakdown of parties that once contributed to the polarization of the economic cleavage due to their adoption of unorthodox positions that diluted their brands. Although these accounts diverge in the identification of the relevant causes of differences in party system responsiveness across South America, they tend to contrast the same groups of countries when it comes to differences in terms of the stability and the responsiveness of party systems. They also converge in looking primarily at the economic state-market cleavage as driving alignments between parties and voters.

In this paper, I look at divisions in terms of the authoritarian-democratic regime issue that have complemented the economic cleavage in a number of party systems after re-democratization (Bornschieer 2013; Roberts 2016). I argue that the regime divide has potentially altered the patterns of party competition and voter alignments in South American party systems. While a number of authors have identified regime divides as relevant (Moreno 1999; Hawkins, Kitschelt, and Llamazares 2010; Luna 2014), the interaction between regime and economic divides has so far been underexplored. While it is true that religious-secular divides were important in certain countries, the religious divide has tended to become clearly subordinate to the economic cleavage in strength in most cases (Middlebrook 2000; Hawkins, Kitschelt, and Llamazares 2010; Bornschieer 2013). It is thus the advent of the regime divide

in the late 20th Century that marks the evolution from a mostly unidimensional political space to a two-dimensional pattern of competition. This transformation has the potential to re-draw the partisan alignments because voters may find themselves cross-pressured between the two dimensions.

Party system format. Authoritarian regime legacies have affected not only the competitive dimensions, but also the format of party systems, in Sartori's (1976) terms, by nourishing the formation and institutionalization of new parties. Building new parties represents a challenge in Latin America (Levitsky, Loxton, and Dyck 2016), and in many of the successful cases of party formation since 1978, new parties have links to preceding authoritarian regimes. The reason is that the military dictatorships of the 1970s enjoyed some degree of support not only from elites, but also in the broader population. "Authoritarian successor parties" on the political right were able to capitalize on this support (Loxton 2016). Apart from financial and organization advantages, authoritarian successor parties have ideational resources they can draw upon: their association with the actions and policies of the outgoing authoritarian regime helps them to build their party brand.¹ In a region in which the right has traditionally been weak (Gibson 1996), and where the "left turn" put the right on a defensive (Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014), authoritarian successor parties bolster support for the right and thereby alter the balance of power between the left and right. Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN) founded in 1979 by outgoing dictator Hugo Banzer in Bolivia provided the Bolivian party system with a strong right-wing pole that it had lacked historically (Bornschieer 2019).

1 Loxton (2016) distinguishes two subtypes of authoritarian successor parties (p. 251): Former authoritarian ruling parties and reactive authoritarian successor parties. An example of the former type is the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico. The latter type is created only in reaction to the transition to democracy, allowing former regime incumbents to compete in elections. I do not take up this distinction because it has no straightforward implications for regime divides.

On the political left, authoritarianism has likewise helped new parties to emerge and institutionalize. In what he calls the “paradox of adversity”, Van Dyck (2016) argues that repression helped parties of the left sharpen their programmatic profiles and develop organizational resources. This accounts for the successful establishment of the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) in Mexico. Kestler, Lucca, and Krause (2019) develop a similar argument and extend it to the Frente Amplio (FA) in Uruguay. In line with Shefter’s (1977) classical reasoning, party activists whose commitment to a cause has helped the party survive long periods of repression or being in opposition put party leaders under pressure to stay true to the party’s programmatic profile. This helped left-wing parties such as Brazil’s PT to build “brands” in terms of their economic policy profile (Lupu 2016a).² My claim – which will be verified in the empirical part of this paper – is that the economic profile of parties of this type was complemented and reinforced by their distinctive position on the regime dimension.

As this discussion makes clear, the authoritarian regimes that span the 1960s to the 1980s fundamentally transformed both the format of party systems, as well as their dynamics of competition in a number of Latin American party systems. The next section develops more specific expectations for those South American countries that experienced dictatorships between the 1960s and the 1980s.

What determines the presence and strength of regime divides?

Simply put, the regime question was politicized where parties of the left – either old or new – rallied opposition against repressive regimes, and where the right was associated with the

2 These brands need not remain stable, of course. While the PT maintained its distinctiveness for several electoral cycles, Frente para un País Solidario’s (FREPASO) brand in Argentina was diluted rather quickly (Lupu 2016a). See also Kestler et al. (2019) for a similar analysis including these two cases.

legacies of these regimes in institutional or policy terms. Leaving aside Central America for pragmatic reasons, this paper focuses on eight South American countries that experienced authoritarian rule at some point in the period from the mid-1960s and the early 1980s: Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico.³ I include Mexico although it did not experience military rule because its transition from a competitive authoritarian to a more competitive regime occurred by way of the crystallization of a powerful regime dimension (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010).

Given the atrocities of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian (BA) regimes of the 1970s in particular, regime divides may be expected to structure alignments by their own right. Yet their manifestation is not automatic, but depends on whether parties actually mobilize them, which in turn is more likely under some circumstances than others. A crucial precondition for a regime divide to crystallize is that parties differ in their assessment of prior regime and in the way they propose to deal with its heritage. This is easier, and regime divides should consequently be stronger, where they fit prior patterns of competition. More explicitly, it matters to which extent the regime divide cuts across or reinforces the established economic dimension of conflict. The potential for regime divides to reinforce existing alignments is especially large where military regimes pursued market liberal policies – perhaps irrespective of whether they were particularly successful at doing so or not – and where authoritarianism was a reaction to the perceived threat of the left.⁴ In Chile, the Pinochet regime not only deposed a left-wing government led by Salvador Allende, it also introduced a highly transformative economic policy turn. The BA regime in Uruguay, on the other hand, was arguably less successful in the latter respect (Castiglioni 2005). Despite this difference, in both cases, left parties established prior to the military coups in 1973 rallied the pro-democratic vote, and the regime’s economic policy orientation helped them in doing so. As a

3 I leave out Paraguay due to its limited experience with democracy.

4 See Weyland (2019) for a discussion of the differing degrees of threat perception on the right after the Cuban revolution.

consequence, their identities and their internal cohesion were reinforced by the regime divide.⁵

The legacy of a military regime that did not pursue market liberal policies, and was not a reaction to the perception of the left as a threat to conservative interests is less likely to be politicized by established parties. The BA regime in Argentina, for example, was installed during a phase of generalized instability and amidst insurgency on the left and right, and it largely failed in pursuing market-oriented policies (Cavarozzi 1986, 43–45). Partially as a consequence, support for or opposition against the military regimes tended to cut across partisan alignments: Neither before the 1976 military coup, nor after re-democratization did the two major parties differ significantly in their stances regarding democracy (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 143–68).⁶ More untypical still is the case of Peru, which experienced “the anomaly of a reformist military government” (Roberts 1998, 201). At least in its initial years under General Velasco, the military pursued rather left-wing economic policies, and these were not completely rolled back by subsequent military leaders (Huber Stephens 1983; Roberts 1998, chap. 7). Together with the split within the left over whether to support or oppose the military government, this made the crystallization of a regime divide less likely. The same applies to Ecuador, where the party system had not been strongly anchored in differing economic policy orientations from the start, and where parties and their leaders suffered from little repression under the dictatorship before the transition in 1978 (Conaghan 1995, 439–47; Roberts 2016).

5 In Chile, the regime divide even had organizational consequences by provoking a schism between the Socialists (PS), which had been in government in the early 1970s during the Allende presidency, and the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD), which broke away from the Socialists (Huber and Stephens 2012; Roberts 1998, chap. 4; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). As we will see, this schism is particularly relevant at the voter level, but it was not a necessary condition for the manifestation of a regime divide in Chile because the regime divide overlaps with the pre-existing economic cleavage.

6 While “Alfonsín’s electoral victory over an old-style Peronist machine candidate in 1983 was widely interpreted as stemming from the former’s more steadfast commitment to democracy (...)” according to Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013, 153), the dictatorship strengthened those sectors in both major parties that were committed to democracy (ibid, p. 148-154).

Although authoritarian regimes in Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico also did not have a clear economic policy penchant that was easily amenable to mobilization, authoritarian regimes strongly impinged on the format of party systems in these cases. Indeed, some of the most successful new parties that emerged in South America since the late 1970s have links to the preceding authoritarian regime (Levitsky, Loxton, and Dyck 2016), as already discussed. I argue that new parties directly related to the authoritarian regime open up a distinct path to the politicization of regime divides. Parties that either grew out of repression or that were formed to defend the authoritarian elite's political stakes in the new democratic regime are likely to differ from their competitors in the way they propose to deal with the authoritarian heritage. In Bolivia, I therefore expect authoritarian rule to have introduced a new political divide not intimately related to the economic state-market dimension. Military governments between 1964 and 1981 basically continued to support the state capitalist model prevalent before 1964, when the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) government was overthrown (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). But as mentioned, authoritarian rule affected the country's legacy of weak party system divides because it strengthened the right. When the country was steering towards competitive elections in 1979, outgoing dictator Hugo Banzer sought to extend his rule by creating a political party, ADN, to support his presidential bid (Whitehead 2001, 27–28).⁷ This provided conservative interests with a strong pole that they had traditionally lacked in democratic Bolivia, and I expect this to facilitate the emergence of a regime divide – and potentially also a stronger economic cleavage.

Finally, I expect strong regime divides in both Brazil and Mexico because both countries fit Lamounier's (1989) paradigmatic description of the Brazilian transition as an "opening through elections". Because elections were maintained, a strong regime divide emerged already under the dictatorship in Brazil (von Mettenheim 1995). The antagonism between

⁷ After the death of Hugo Banzer, ADN changed its name to PODEMOS under the leadership of Jorge Quiroga.

parliamentarians that were proponents of democracy and those defending the dictatorship was blurred due to opportunistic party switching on the part of politicians from the pro-regime to the pro-democratic Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) (Hagopian 1996). But the PT emerged as a consistently pro-democratic party that was different from the traditional, heavily clientelistic way of doing politics in Brazil (Keck 1992).⁸ On the right side of the spectrum, the Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) is the heir of the party that explicitly supported the bureaucratic authoritarian regime in Brazil, and was also able to reap the advantages that authoritarian successor parties enjoy (Levitsky, Loxton, and Dyck 2016; Loxton 2016). The BA regime's economic policies did not predispose Brazil to developing a regime divide nourished by the economic policy heritage of the authoritarian regime. Nonetheless, the fact that the PT initially exhibited a staunchly state interventionist economic profile makes it an open question to which degree the regime dimension was reinforced by economic conflicts – although this dimension had traditionally been weak in Brazil. In Mexico, finally, the role of the regime divide in forging an opening of the dominant party regime is well documented (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). Both PRD, as well as PAN are associated with the democracy, while the former dominant party, PRI, survived the transition to a competitive regime that was completed with the victory of PAN in the 2000 elections. However, because the economic and the regime dimensions cross-cut each other strongly, strategic considerations in presidential races push voters to prioritize the regime divide (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006).

8 This was the case even more so for the PT than with respect to the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), which broke away from the PMDB.

Three scenarios for the prevalence and strength of regime divides

This section summarizes the preceding discussion into three scenarios impinging on the presence, strength, and character of regime divides. These scenarios are presented in Figure 1, and I discuss them in turn, moving from left to right. Where an authoritarian regime was present, either the ideational resources stemming from its market liberalizing character, or the organizational resources provided by new parties facilitate the emergence of a regime dimension. Where political actors can draw on neither of the two, regime divides are likely to be nonexistent or weak. I hypothesize this to be the case in Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador, as reflected in the scenario on the far left in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Three scenarios for the formation of regime divides in eight South American countries

Where the authoritarian regime triggered the emergence of new parties, regime divides can crystallize even in the absence of the ideational opportunities provided by the market liberal character of the outgoing regime. Scenario 2 encompasses both cases where these new parties were authoritarian successor parties of the right – with links to the authoritarian regime (Loxton 2016) – as well as new parties of the left that were born out of the repression exerted by authoritarian regimes (Van Dyck 2016). Although the latter clearly have a left-wing economic agenda, the fact that the regime divide does not map onto the economic dimension means that voters' views of democracy may well be unrelated to their economic preferences. The fact that the left draws primarily on the repressive character of the outgoing regime and less on the economic policies it pursued then mitigates the strength of the regime divide. I expect the Bolivian, Brazilian, and Mexican cases to conform to this scenario, and to exhibit genuine regime divides.

Where the ideational heritage of the regime is characterized both by its authoritarian character, as well as its economic policies, on the other hand, I expect regime divides to be especially strong. In this scenario, the left mobilizes a dual opposition against the authoritarian regime, where denouncing human rights abuses goes hand in hand with a defense of state intervention against market liberalism. The right, on the other hand, defends market liberalism, as well as the institutional legacies of the authoritarian regime. As a consequence, the regime and economic divides are mutually reinforcing, rather than cross-cutting. Chile and Uruguay fit this expectation. The BA regimes in these two countries galvanized opposition along a composite divide where economic and regime issues were mutually reinforcing. Certainly, following this trajectory was facilitated by two factors: First, Chile and Uruguay stand out in Latin America in terms of their strong economic cleavages (e.g., Kitschelt et al. 2010b; Bornschieer 2019). Second, not being involved in neoliberal reforms, the left was able to rally opposition against market liberalism, therefore reinforcing the traditional cleavage (Roberts 2013, 2014).

If the regime divide maps onto the economic cleavage, as in this third scenario, it can crystallize even without new parties emerging. The Pinochet regime did result in the formation of authoritarian successor parties and a breakaway from the Socialists explicitly defining itself with reference to democracy, the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD). Likewise, the right reorganized during the transition to democracy, but this did not fundamentally alter the preconditions for the mobilization of the regime divide. Likewise, the Frente Amplio in Uruguay predated the BA regime, although it of course grew considerably after re-democratization.

Research design

Dimensions and time points. The analysis assesses to which extent party systems and voter alignments in South America are structured by a regime dimension, and then studies the interplay between the regime dimension and the economic state-market dimension. There is a broad consensus that the latter has been the most important dimension of party competition in South America since the early 20th Century (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Collier and Collier, 2002; Moreno, 1999; Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009; Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 2012). The analysis draws on elite survey data from parliamentarians on the one hand, and mass-level survey data on the other. The earliest point in time for which data of this kind are available across countries is the mid-1990s, when the first wave of interviews with parliamentarians was conducted by the University of Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA) project. This point in time is reasonably close to the transition to democracy in the 1980s to analyze early regime divides after re-democratization. Generally, the face-to-face interviews with legislators that the PELA data is based on were conducted at the beginning of each legislative period (Alcántara Sáez 2008).

Thus, they allow for an assessment of the relationship between party positions and voter preferences shortly after elections in which parties received a mandate from voters. Because the earliest PELA survey available for Brazil is from 2005, I use the Brazilian Legislative Survey (Power and Zucco 2011) to measure party positions in 1997.⁹

The point in time at which the first wave of PELA surveys were conducted is very close to the fieldwork of the World Values Survey's (WVS) 1994-99 wave, where interviews were also conducted in 1995 and 1996 in most countries. Combining these data sources, it is possible to assess whether a regime divide is present and to measure to which degree it resonates with voter preferences in Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. For Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador, I draw on the Latinobarómetro surveys to measure voter preferences.¹⁰ In Brazil, the elite surveys were conducted towards the end of the legislative term, and I have matched them with mass-level data as proximate as possible to the election that brought the parliament in power. Table 1 presents an overview of the data sources used, and indicates the proximate election in which the parliament was elected. The issue-specific items contained in the elite and mass surveys and their assignment to the regime and economic state-market divides is discussed further below together with the presentation of the results.

Measuring party system responsiveness. Party system responsiveness has frequently been assessed by looking at the correspondence between the political preferences of voters and their representatives (Dalton, 1985; Powell, 2000; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Drawing on Wlezien (2017), I refer to *responsiveness* rather than congruence between voter preferences and party positions because the data I use does not allow for a measure of the absolute congruence between the positions of legislators and voters.

9 Thus, for the 1994-1998 legislature in Brazil, I opted for the 1995 Latinobarómetro dataset (the earliest available) because of its temporal proximity to the elections in 1994, given that party preferences are relatively unstable in Brazil.

10 Some of the limitations of the Latinobarómetro surveys will be discussed in the Appendix.

I operationalize competitive dimensions at both the party and the voter levels by drawing on all available issue-specific items available in the elite and mass surveys that pertain to the regime and economic dimensions. The following issues are used from the elite and mass surveys to construct the economic and regime dimensions:

Regime dimension

- *Regime*: Assessment of past military regime (if there was a military dictatorship), support for democracy, opposition against authoritarianism and strong rulers.
- *Army*: Assessment of having the army rule, and whether the armed forces should be “a force in national development”.

Economic state-market dimension

- *Welfare*: Expansion of or defense of a generous welfare state, support for public education, redistribution, and equality.
- *Economic liberalism*: Opposition to market regulation, and protectionism, support for deregulation, for more competition, and privatization.

In empirical terms, in countries with a history of military intervention, the regime dimension often meshes assessments of the army with orientations towards democracy, as earlier analyses of the dimensionality of political space reveal (Bornschier, 2013). The current analysis confirms these findings. The reason it makes sense to include items tapping evaluations of the role of the armed forces is that respondents in many countries are reluctant to express skepticism towards democracy, but are willing to say that they favor a strong role of the military or assess past military interventions positively. In order to allow for these country differences in the make-up of the regime dimension, I include both assessments of the democracy and past authoritarian regimes, as well as of the desired contemporary role of the armed forces. The specific items used differ at the elite and mass levels, and also across data

sources, and for this reason are discussed together with the results pertaining to the empirical make-up of the regime and economic dimensions in the next section.

Table 1: Cases, data sources, and proximate elections

Country	Elite data	Mass data	Proximate election
<i>Cases with regime divides</i>			
Brazil	1997 (BLS) ^a	1995 (LB)	1994
	2005 (PELA) ^a	2002 (ESEB)	2002
	2011 (PELA) ^a	2007 (LAPOP)	2006
Bolivia	1996 (PELA)	1996 (LB) ^b	1993
	2006 (PELA)	2005 (LB)	2005
Chile	1994 (PELA)	1996 (WVS)	1993
	2006 (PELA)	2005 (WVS)	
Mexico	1995 (PELA)	1995 (WVS)	1994
	2006 (63)	2005 (WVS)	2006
Uruguay	1996 (PELA)	1996 (WVS)	1994
	2005 (PELA)	2005 (WVS)	2004
<i>Cases with no clear regime divides (and no over-time analysis)</i>			
Argentina	1995 (PELA)	1996 (WVS)	1993
Ecuador	1996 (PELA)	1996 (LB)	1996
Peru	1995 (PELA)	1996 (WVS)	1995

Key to data sources: PELA: Surveys of Latin American Legislators (<http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/index.htm>); BLS: Brazilian Legislative Survey (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/14970>); WVS: World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org); LB: Latinobarómetro (www.latinobarometro.org).

^a In Brazil, the elite surveys were conducted towards the end of the legislature, in contrast to the other cases (see discussion in the main text).

^b Bolivia is not included in the 1995 Latinobarómetro, but the 1996 wave – while being more remote from the elections in 1993 – is temporally close to the elite survey.

Because the item wordings differ to some degree at the mass and elite levels, across countries over time, I construct latent dimensions both at the elite and mass levels, allowing for a comparison of positions across the two levels. The choice of strategy to aggregate these issues into an overarching dimension is not straightforward in Latin America, however.

Absent the ideological schemas prevalent in more established democracies, respondents may not give consistent answers to questions that on theoretical grounds clearly relate to the same underlying concept (Harbers, de Vries and Steenbergen, 2013). Using factor analysis including also issues that respondents are less sure about then blurs the positions of parties and voters. As a consequence, we might underestimate the level of party system responsiveness with respect to the most salient issues. I avoid this problem by using canonical linear discriminant analysis to operationalize latent dimensions, both at the level of legislators, as well as at the voter level. This technique uncovers dimensions that are politically meaningful because they help to distinguish respondents according to their party affiliation or preference. In other words, the analysis makes the operationalization of policy dimensions center on those political issues that set politicians and voters from different parties apart. Respondents' position on the first discriminant function is then used to determine their economic preference. This approach is rather benevolent in terms of judging the responsiveness of a party system, akin to Luna and Zechmeister's (2005) "best score" practice (where only those items for each category are taken into account that exhibit the highest match between parties and voters). Hence, the measurement is conservative in that it is more likely to overestimate rather than to underestimate responsiveness. Given that programmatic structuring is not overwhelming in strength in South America, a benevolent approach is advisable in order to generate variance.

The final step is to measure responsiveness by assessing the correspondence between the positions of parties and those of their voters. Because the positions of parties and voters are not measured on the same scales, this correspondence can be judged only in *relative* terms. I do so by regressing the position on the state-market dimension of the party a respondent voted for on his/her individual preference along this dimension, using ordered logit regression.¹¹ Put

¹¹ Technically, I attribute to each individual the policy position of his/her party, and then assess how well individual preferences explain the position of the party they voted for. Since the variance of the dependent

differently, the capacity of voter preferences to explain the ideological position of their preferred party constitutes my measure of responsiveness. The most important information provided by this analysis is not the coefficient (which again is not independent of the differing scales on which parties and voters are placed), but whether individual preferences are a significant predictor of party position. The z-statistic of the ordered logit regression is thus a straightforward measure for congruence. The most important feature of this measure is that it can be compared within countries over time as well as across countries.

Analysis: The nature of regime and economic dimensions after re-democratization

Studying the presence and the importance of regime divides involves three steps: First, to determine which countries exhibit regime divides at the elite level, second, to assess to which extent the divide at the elite level also cleaves voters, and, finally, to measure the responsiveness of the party system along the regime divide. The next section will then focus on the interplay of the economic and regime dimensions and their relative strength. The final empirical section looks at the evolution of the two dimensions over time.

At the party level, the challenge in detecting regime divides is that parliamentarians are for the most part reluctant to express sympathies for authoritarianism and overwhelmingly voice support for democracy. The item asking respondents whether democracy is always preferable – also in a context of economic crisis and political instability – does not generally exhibit much variance (see also Luna 2014, 122). An interesting exception is the Chilean case, where I am able to include this item in the measurement of the regime divide. The PELA surveys

variable is limited by the number of parties competing, I use ordered logit instead of OLS regression. The approach is set out in more detail in (Bornschieer 2013).

feature one issue item to measure the regime dimension that powerfully sets apart legislators in various countries, however: Respondents' assessments of the role of the armed forces in the 1970s and beyond. Additionally, I use an item asking respondents if the armed forces "should be a force in national development", which also tends to be related to the regime dimension. While perhaps not an ideal item from a theoretical point of view (because it can have different meanings for different respondents), in certain cases it reveals highly plausible contrasts between parties. More specifically, the item seems to tap a propensity towards authoritarianism that other measures – which tackle the question more upfront – fail to detect. The results of the Discriminant analyses using the elite data are presented in Table 2. I discuss those countries where we would expect regime divides to be important in more depth than the others and return to the cases without regime divides later on.

I start the discussion with those countries where the theoretical expectations predicted the manifestation of a regime divide, and later turn to those countries that lack the relevant preconditions. In line with expectations, Table 2 reveals salient regime divides at the elite level in Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico. In these cases, at least one political camp is closely associated with the regime divide. Only Uruguay is an ambiguous case in terms of the results: While the first discriminant function is fairly strong in terms of the canonical correlation, and shaped predominantly by the item regarding the role of the armed forces in the 1970s, it fails to reach conventional levels of significance. This seems to be due to the strongly pro-democratic culture in Uruguay and the resulting reluctance of legislators to openly express support for authoritarianism (93% of legislators say that democracy is preferable under all circumstances to any other type of regime). As we will see later on, voters are well aware of the different relationship between the parties of the left and right with respect to the 1973-1984 Bureaucratic Authoritarian regime, however.

Table 2: The Regime Dimension at the Party Level, Mid-1990s (Results of Canonical Linear Discriminant Analysis, first function reported)

Issue-items	<i>Authoritarian past, regime divide expected</i>					<i>Authoritarian past, but no regime divide expected</i>		
	Chile	Uruguay	Brazil	Bolivia	Mexico	Argentina†	Peru	Ecuador
<i>PELA Surveys</i>								
Democracy preference ¹²	-0.19	no var.				no var.	0.53	no var.
Role of armed forces 70s	-0.99	0.94		0.49	1.00**	(1.00**)		1.00**
Military role	-0.03	0.30		0.79			0.77	
<i>Brazilian Leg. Survey</i>								
Decree power			-0.63					
Army internal order			-0.63					
Civilian defense minister			-0.36					
N	87	73	141	65	117	42	71	57
Canonical correlation	0.88	0.35	0.53	0.42	0.73	(0.31)	0.32	0.30
Eigenvalue	3.27	0.14	0.39	0.22	1.12	(0.11)	0.11	0.10
Prop. variance explained	99%	86%	84%	75%	100%#	(100%#)	86%	100%#
p-value of F-statistic	0.0000	0.10	0.0000	0.04	0.000	(0.12)	0.08	0.16
Elite regime dimension present?	yes	weak	yes	yes	yes	absent	weak	weak

Note: Results presented in this table are based on variables with imputed missing values. For imputation, I ran a prior Canonical linear discriminant analysis, and used only those variables with canonical structure coefficients of |0.20| or higher and pointed in the expected direction. Consequently, the variables for which no canonical structure coefficients are shown in this table are those omitted from the analysis.

Single dimension revealed.

* Single economic item featured in the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS) from 1997.

** Single item makes up to first discriminant function after omitting variables with loadings below |0.20|.

† Positions on discriminant function cannot be predicted due to high number of ties (very limited variance, two or more group posterior probabilities are equal for 42 of 46 observations).

12 The item asks whether respondents deem democracy preferable even in context of economic difficulties or political instability.

Looking in more detail at the make-up of the regime dimension in these countries, we see that in Chile, the item most strongly shaping this dimension – as in Uruguay – is the one concerning the role of the armed forces during the dictatorship. The discriminant function is highly significant in predicting party membership. In Brazil, where I draw on the items available in the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS), the regime dimension centers on the question whether the armed forces should be allowed to intervene to ensure internal order, as well as on granting sweeping decree powers to the president. Mexico has a powerful regime divide centering on the role of the armed forces in the 1970s. While Mexico did not experience military rule, the significance of this item can be interpreted as indicating different orientations vis-à-vis the large-scale repression, and particularly the crackdown on a mass demonstration in 1968 (Di Tella 2004, 117–18; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 217–18).

The next question is whether elite regime divides indeed mirror diverging orientations regarding democracy among electorates. Table 3 suggests that this is generally the case: Regime divides are clearly crystallized in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil and Mexico. For the countries covered by the WVS, there are a number of issues that tap the democracy-authoritarian divide well, including questions that pertain to the value of democracy on the one hand, and to rule by the army on the other hand. Similarly to the elite survey, there is an item pertaining to the previous regime, and this item is of overwhelming importance in structuring mass regime divides in Chile and Uruguay, along with opinions on having the army rule. In Mexico, the regime divide is broadly based in orientations concerning democracy and authoritarianism.¹³ For Brazil, I rely on an item from the 1995 Latinobarómetro asking respondents about their confidence in the army. Although far less explicit than the question regarding the past military regime, it seems to tap something similar, and strongly cleaves

13 Assessments of the regime in place ten years ago are not relevant in Mexico. Although electoral competition had become much more intense, this is not so surprising given that the country had not yet experienced alternation in power in the mid-1990s.

Table 3: The Regime Dimension at the Voter Level, Mid-1990s (Results of Canonical Linear Discriminant Analysis, first function reported)

Issue-items	<i>Authoritarian past, regime divide expected</i>					<i>Authoritarian past, but no regime divide expected</i>		
	Chile	Uruguay	Brazil	Bolivia†	Mexico	Argentina	Peru	Ecuador
<i>World Values Survey</i>								
Previous regime	0.96	0.75				-0.52	-0.66	
Strong ruler		0.35			-0.41	-0.59		
Army rule	0.71	0.57			-0.24	-0.66	-0.40	
Democracy preference	0.31				-0.41	-0.54	-0.52	
Order vs. freedom		0.51			-0.33	-0.72	-0.52	
Democracy better form of government	0.35				-0.77		-0.47	
<i>Latinobarómetro 1995</i>								
Democracy preference								
Firm hand			0.18					
Confidence in army			0.98					
<i>Latinobarómetro 1996</i>								
Democracy preference				0.46				
Defend democracy				0.98				1.00*
N	531	699	484	390	1078	574	668	729
Canonical correlation	0.53	0.50	0.20	0.16	0.14	0.20	0.20	0.08
Eigenvalue	0.40	0.33	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.01
Prop. variance explained	94%	96%	91%	89%	67%	83%	56%	100%#
p-value of F-statistic	0.0000	0.000	0.002	0.30	0.01	0.0027	0.0038	0.30
Mass regime dimension present?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Responsiveness measure (z-value)	10.8	12.2	4.1	2.6	3.4	–	3.6	-0.8

Note: Results presented in this table are based on variables with imputed missing values. For imputation, I ran a prior Canonical linear discriminant analysis, and used only those variables with canonical structure coefficients of |0.20| or higher and pointed in the expected direction. The variables for which no canonical structure coefficients are shown in this table are those omitted from the analysis. # Single dimension revealed * Solution is unidimensional.

† See Appendix for results of the alternative operationalization mentioned in the main text.

electorates. Turning to Bolivia, the more limited number of items available in the 1996 Latinobarómetro survey again makes this a less ideal data source than the WVS.¹⁴ The regime divide that centers on the preference for a democratic regime and willingness to defend democracy fails to reach statistical significance.¹⁵

In terms of the five countries where the authoritarian heritage predisposed party systems to see regime divides emerge – either due to the ideational or the party organizational heritage of the authoritarian regime – three feature regime divides both at the elite and the mass levels: Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. Uruguay has a very strong mass-level regime divide that fails to be mirrored by the party system, as we saw. Bolivia has an elite divide that is not clearly mirrored at the mass level. Turning to my overall indicator for the strength of the divide, the responsiveness of party system, regime divides are present in all five countries, but their strength varies. The responsiveness measure is extremely high in Chile and Uruguay, overpowering alignments along the economic dimension, as we will see later (see Figure 8). Regime divides are also strong in Brazil and Mexico, the two countries in which party competition played a pivotal role in opening the authoritarian regime. Finally, in terms of the responsiveness measure, with a z-value of 2.6, there is also a moderately strong regime dimension present in Bolivia (responsiveness values above 1.96 are statistically significant by conventional standards), although the mass-level divide was not significant.

Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador experienced authoritarian regimes, but support for and resistance against these regimes was not organized along party lines.¹⁶ In line with expectations, the absence of enabling factors seems to have inhibited the crystallization of

14 Bolivia is not included in the 1995 Latinobarómetro round, which is why I draw on the 1996 survey. The items included in the 1996 survey are slightly different from those in 1995.

15 In this case, I omitted the item tapping confidence in the armed forces as its inclusion results in a even weaker dimension. This alternative operationalization does not result in a significant measure for responsiveness ($z=1.04$, $p=0.30$), contrary to the one excluding confidence in the armed forces (see the discussion of this result below).

16 Ecuador's regime type was authoritarian from 1970 to 1978, and Peru from 1968 to 1979 (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 67–68).

regime divides at the elite level. No regime dimension is apparent either at the elite or the mass level in Ecuador. The results are mixed with respect to Peru and Argentina. These two countries show significant differences between electorates in terms of their support for democracy and authoritarianism, although party systems did not clearly mirror regime divides. The case of Argentina is clear-cut at the elite level: The high number of ties in the discriminant function indicates the absence whatsoever of a regime divide among parties.¹⁷ At the voter level, however, the regime divide is powerful in setting apart the Peronist PJ, the Radicals (UCR), and the Frente para un País Solidario (FREPASO), a spin-off from the Peronist PJ disagreeing with the latter's endorsement of free markets under Menem. This dimension makes substantive sense as a broad-based regime divide, as can be seen in Table 3, suggesting that it is meaningful despite the rather low canonical correlation.

The location of electorates on this dimension – which is shown in Figure 2 – makes sense in that the Radicals are the party most strongly associated with democracy (McGuire 1995). The location of FREPASO voters also makes substantive sense, while Peronist voters exhibit the most authoritarian orientations, as perhaps expected. But because parties did not offer contrasting profiles in terms of regime issues, it is not possible to determine the responsiveness of the party system in the Argentine case. In any event, it is unlikely that the pattern uncovered by Figure 2 stems from Argentina's authoritarian BA regime in the 1970s, but rather seems associated with the immediate post-redemocratization phase. Despite the presence of a mass regime divide, the overall evidence suggests that the authoritarian regime in Argentina did not have a lasting legacy in terms of a regime divide.

¹⁷ A tie in the classification occurs when two or more group posterior probabilities are equal for an observation, i.e. it is impossible to predict legislators' party affiliation.




Figure 2: Argentina – Electorates on the Regime Divide, 1993 Elections

Legend: FREPASO, Frente para un País Solidario; UCR, Unión Cívica Radical; PJ, Partido Justicialista (Peronists); no vota/blanco, respondents who declare they would not vote or would vote blank if elections were held the next day.

Note: Lines below positions indicate standard deviations.

The Peruvian case proves difficult to assess because the analysis of its regime dimension is confounded by Alberto Fujimori's 1992 autogolpe, three years before the measurement. This renders the assessment of the impact of the 1968-1980 dictatorship all but impossible. This conclusion is based on results presented in Appendix B. Together with the evidence presented so far, this suggests that the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s did not trigger the emergence of regime divides in Argentina, Peru and Ecuador.

The relationship between the regime and state-market dimensions: Parties and voters in the two-dimensional political space

Having established that regime divides indeed structure voter alignments in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, I now take a closer look at the positions of parties and voters along the regime and economic state-market divides and study the interplay between the two. To locate parties and electorates, I use their mean positions on the dimensions determined by the Discriminant Analyses presented in the preceding section for the regime divide. The analyses for the state-market dimension are presented in Tables A1 (for parties) and Table A2 (for voters) in the Appendix. Figures 3 to 7 locate parties and voters in the two-dimensional space. In terms of the visual presentation, my focus here is on the relative polarization of parties and their electorates along the two dimensions, but I also report two types of other


results: First, the degree to responsiveness of party systems along each dimension, based on the Ordered Logit Regressions, and, second, the individual level correlation between economic and regime preferences as the voter level. More unambiguously than the aggregated positions of voters, the individual-level correlation indicates the degree to which dimensions overlap or cross-cut each other.

The Chilean party system is highly polarized along both dimensions, and the state-market and regime dimensions are highly correlated at the elite level, as we can see in Figure 3. The three parties making up the Concertación – PS, PPD and PDC – hardly differ in their positions. All three occupy a state interventionist and pro-democratic position. RN and UDI lie at the opposite pole on both divides: They are situated in the market liberal terrain and differ staunchly from the Concertación parties in terms of their assessment of the Pinochet regime. The bars indicating the standard deviations of individual legislators’ positions show that both the parties of the left as well as those on the right are also very homogeneous internally.

Turning to the voter level, it is strikingly clear that electorates differ much more along the regime than along the state-market dimension. This is mirrored in the responsiveness measure indicated below Figure 3, which is considerably higher for the regime than the economic dimension.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the measure shows that the party system remained quite responsiveness along the economic dimension after re-democratization. This result nuances the stark view according to which the overpowering importance of the regime divide has dealigned the party system along the economic cleavage (e.g., Mainwaring and Torcal 2003, Luna 2014). Finally, the comparison of the positions of parties with those of their electorates shows that the electorates within the left and right camps are more distinctive than the parties

18 PDC, PPD and PS hardly differ at all in their economic policy positions, and using their precise positions along the state-market dimension therefore misleadingly depicts responsiveness as low because Ordered Logit regression is sensitive to the ordering of values. I have therefore assigned the same party positions to the three parties making up the Concertación alliance. Applying the same procedure in cases where parties are located close to one another does not change the results in any of the other countries.

themselves. This indicates that while the authoritarian regime seems to have brought parties' programmatic positions closer to one another, this is not the case to the same extent for voters. For example, one of the factors mitigating responsiveness along the economic dimension is that PPD voters stand out only in terms of their regime preferences, while they do not differ much on average from RN voters in terms of their economic preferences – despite the large distance between the two parties at the elite level. PPD legislators are thus out of touch with their voters.



Responsiveness (z-value, 5 parties)


Regime dimension: 10.8 (p<0.000) — Economic dimension: 3.2 (p<0.001)

Figure 3: Chile – Parties and Voters on the Regime and Economic Divides, 1993 Elections

Legend: PPD, Partido Por la Democracia; PS, Socialist Party; DC, Christian Democrat Party; RN, Renovación Nacional; UDI, Unión Demócrata Independiente.

Uruguay presents a similar picture (Figure 4). The Frente Amplio occupies the pro-democratic and state interventionist pole of the party system, while the PC and PN – the two

traditional parties – are more market liberal and more lenient with respect to the role of the armed forces in the 1970s. At the voter level, electorates again differ much more with respect to their regime than their economic preferences: The stark differences that parties draw among themselves along the economic cleavage are thus not mirrored at the voter level. Both at the party and the voter level, the smaller Nuevo Espacio stands out much more in terms of regime preference than along the economic dimension, similarly to PPD in Chile. Overall, it is the regime issue that cleaves voters, along two fissures: First, that between the left and right, as we would expect based on the repression the FA suffered from under the authoritarian regime and the pro-market reforms the regime sought to enact. Second, an interesting difference is visible between Colorados (PC) and Partido Blanco/Nacional (PN) voters that seems to mirror that it was a Colorado who abandoned democracy in 1973.



Responsiveness (z-value, 4 parties)
 Regime dimension: 12.2 (p<0.000) — Economic dimension 5.8 (p<0.000)

Figure 4: Uruguay – Parties and Voters on the Regime and Economic Divides, 1994 Elections

Legend: FA, Frente Amplio; PN, Partido Nacional; PC, Partido Colorado; NE, Nuevo Espacio.

Despite the dominance of the regime over the economic dimension, the results confirm the expectation that the two divides are related in Chile and Uruguay. More specifically, for most parties and their electorates, the two dimensions are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting. This is clearly evident from Figures 3 and 4 at the party level, where parties' economic policy positions strongly predict their stances with respect to regime issues: The left staunchly advocates democracy and opposes dictatorship, while the right is associated with authoritarianism. At the voter level, this "composite" character of the regime divide that aligns the regime issue with economic policy preferences is also visible, although differences along the regime divide set electorates apart much more powerfully than their economic policy preferences. The economic and regime preferences are positively and significantly correlated at the individual voter level, however: The association of $r=0.14$ in Chile ($p=0.000$) and $r=0.16$ in Uruguay ($p=0.000$) sets these two cases apart from contexts where the authoritarian regime's policy orientation did not favor the integration of economic and regime preferences, as we will see shortly. At the same time, the regime dimension overpowers the economic cleavage in the immediate period after re-democratization. At least for Chile, this result is in line with prior research, although it contradicts stark claims of the party system no longer representing voters' economic preferences.

I now turn to the three countries in which the regime divide was not mobilized by established parties along the classical state-market divide, but rather by new parties that define themselves primarily in terms of their regime preference. This proposition is perhaps most disputable in the Brazilian case, where the PT emerged from and cultivated close links with the independent labor movement under the BA regime. But nonetheless, more than anything else, the PT stood for a different, more democratic and less particularistic way of doing politics at least in its initial years (Keck 1992; Samuels 2006; Gómez Bruera 2013; Hunter

2010). In terms of its position in political space, Figure 5 shows that the PT is set far apart from the other parties, being situated simultaneously at the pro-democratic pole of the regime dimension and the state interventionist pole of the economic dimension. The PFL's position




Figure 5: Brazil – Parties and Voters on the Regime and Economic Divides, 1994 Elections

Legend: PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores; PMDB, Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro; PSDB, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira; PFL, Partido da Frente Liberal (now Democratas); PPB, Partido Progressista Brasileiro.

is also in line with what we would expect from an authoritarian successor party: It occupies the more authoritarian terrain, while also being on the market liberal side of the economic spectrum. The position of the PSDB along the regime dimension is more surprising. Overall, party positions mirror those of their electorates, albeit in a somewhat less polarized way.¹⁹

¹⁹ Interestingly, and in line with the discussion in the theoretical section, while PMDB legislators still depict their position in rather pro-democratic terms, the party's voters are no longer distinct from those supporting


Responsiveness is higher along the regime dimension, but voters' economic preferences do explain their preferred parties' positions quite well (the relationship is significant at the 0.01 level). The power of the regime divide suggests that by triggering the formation of parties with more clear-cut profiles, the post-authoritarian period not only saw a stronger structuring of the party system than had traditionally been the case (c.f. Hagopian, Gervasoni, and Moraes 2009), but also one that was more responsive to voter preferences. While the PT's voters appear distinctive on both dimensions, the Brazilian case differs from that of Chile and Uruguay in that the economic and regime dimensions are not correlated at the individual voter level ($r=-0.01$, $p=0.85$). Each of the two main party system divides appeals to different groups of voters, in other words, and the economic and regime divides thus cross-cut each other. The next section will assess the implications of this finding for the longer-term persistence of the regime divide in Brazil.

Competition in the Bolivian party system after the Banzer dictatorship is not frequently discussed as centering heavily on regime issues. The results shown in Figure 6 demonstrate that the party system is quite polarized along the regime divide, however. On the one hand, this is due to ADN as the authoritarian successor party. On the other, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA),²⁰ as well as the established MNR occupy the pro-democratic space. It is only along this dimension – and not the economic divide – that the party system mirrors voter preferences, as the responsiveness measure shows. Although CONDEPA's support for democracy does not mirror its voters' regime preferences, responsiveness is remarkably high along the regime dimension. Along the economic dimension, electorates' mean preferences hardly differ, and some parties like ADN clearly misrepresent their voters. Again, as in the Brazilian case, the two dimensions are not correlated at the individual voter level ($r=0.01$, $p=0.84$). Again, the analysis confirms the

PFL, the authoritarian successor party. This mirrors the fact that the contrast between Arena and PMDB vanished during the transition, leaving the role of the pro-democratic party to the PT, as discussed earlier.

20 CONDEPA was an indigenous party that failed to develop a more encompassing ethno-populist appeal as MAS later did, however (Madrid 2008).

expectation that in the absence of an economic policy heritage of authoritarian regimes, regime divides cross-cut, rather than reinforce the economic dimension. The Bolivian party system shows a differing trajectory from the Brazilian one in the dynamic of party system responsiveness over time, however, which I address in the next section.




Responsiveness (z-value, 5 parties)
 Regime dimension: 2.6 (p≤0.01) — Economic dimension -0.2 (p≤0.87)

Figure 6: Bolivia – Parties and Voters on the Regime and Economic Divides, 1993 Elections

Legend; UCS, Unidad Cívica Solidaridad; ADN, Acción Democrática Nacional; MNR, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; MBL, Movimiento Bolivia Libre.

In Mexico, the final case, the party-system level configuration shown in Figure 7 closely corresponds to theoretical expectations: The dominant PRI’s economic position is centrist and is challenged by a pro-democratic party both on the left and on the right. Both dimensions are quite polarizing at the party level. While the position of electorates is less polarized, they do



Responsiveness (z-value, 3 parties)

Regime dimension: 3.4 ($p \leq 0.001$) — Economic dimension 2.3 ($p \leq 0.02$)

Figure 7: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Regime and Economic Divides, 1994 Elections

Legend: PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional; PRD, Partido de la Revolución Democrática; PAN, Partido Acción Nacional; PT, Partido del Trabajo.

correspond to those of their parties.²¹ The voters of the small Partido del Trabajo (PT) occupy a distinctive left-wing authoritarian position in political space, but we cannot compare this location to that of the party itself due to its small size (it is not included in the PELA survey). Overall, party system responsiveness is higher along the regime divide: While both dimensions shape alignments, but the regime divide is stronger in this respect. Contrary to Brazil and Bolivia, the two dimensions are overlapping, rather than cross-cutting at the voter level: they are correlated at $r = -0.16$ ($p = 0.000$) at the individual level, meaning that more market liberal economic preferences are associated with more democratic regime preferences. This is what we would expect given that PAN was the stronger of the two challenger parties in the period in question. One could also argue that the historical PRI regime has a center-left

21 The finding that voters are less polarized than parties is in line with the literature on the Mexican case (see, e.g., Bruhn and Greene 2009).

policy orientation, but this was orientation was lost by the PRI's move to the center in 1946 (Collier and Collier 2002, Bornschier 2019).

In sum, the preceding section showed that regime divides are present in South America only where parties can draw on either the ideational or the organizational resources provided by an authoritarian regime's economic policy legacy or by authoritarian successor parties. This section revealed that in those cases where regime divides are present, they are uniformly stronger than the traditional economic cleavage. In Bolivia, the party system only reflects the regime divide, while parties are unresponsive along the state-market axis. The expectation that regime divides are stronger where they align with the pre-existing economic dimension is also corroborated based on the Chilean and Uruguayan cases. Regime and economic policy preferences overlap at the mass level in these two countries, contrary to Brazil and Bolivia. The two divides are also associated at the voter level in Mexico, however, which is to some extent surprising given that the authoritarian regime's economic policy orientation is less clear. The strength of the regime divide in Mexico is clearly inferior to that in Chile or Uruguay, however.

So far, the results thus tend to support the idea that regime divides are both more aligned with the economic cleavage where parties link their regime positions to their economic credentials, and partially as a result also more powerful. One could argue that these differences in strength are in degree rather than in kind. The further evolution of the two dimensions in terms of the responsiveness they entail contradicts this interpretation: The strength of regime divides follows rather different trajectories in different countries, as we will see in the next section.

What happens when regime divides fade?

Where regime issues were divisive in the immediate post-transition period, they dominated partisans' hearts and minds, as the preceding analysis showed. But what happens as the institutional and policy legacies of authoritarian regimes fade, and democracy is consolidated? In this section, I use data from the mid-2000s – ten years after that used in the preceding section – to assess to which extent regime issues remain salient and how they relate to the economic state-market dimension. Democracy has matured in the four countries that underwent the transition to democracy in the 1980s, and the alternation of power in the 2000 Mexican elections mark the end of competitive authoritarianism in that country.

The difficulty in assessing responsiveness along the regime divide in the mid-2000s is twofold. For one thing, regime divides evolve in their nature over time. As the major obstacles to democracy are removed, debates come to center on more specific issues than the stark contrast between the authoritarian past and liberal democracy – disputes may concern reforms to enable further democratization (or, in other cases, reversals in the democratization process). Thus, the items used to measure regime preferences earlier often no longer reveal much variance in the mid-2000s, particularly at the elite level. Partially as a result, the questions that parliamentarians and voters were asked in surveys also change. Rather than discussing the changing make-up of mass and elite regime divides in detail, Table 4 summarizes their evolving nature and the measurement I use for the second time point in the analysis. The full results will be made available in an Appendix in subsequent versions of this paper.

Starting at the elite level, the divide setting apart preferences for democracy or autocracy has given way to divisions over the extent to which checks and balances should curtail executive prerogatives in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. Only in Chile does this antagonism relate

to the classical regime divide, with the issue whether democracy is the best form of government loading on the same discriminant function as the item on executive prerogatives. But even in Chile, the latter item shapes the function much more strongly. Importantly, this new regime divide cuts across the old one in that it cleaves parties within the left and right blocks. Uruguay and Bolivia differ in that no regime divide whatsoever can be detected at the elite level.

Table 4: Summary of the evolution of regime divides at the elite and mass level in the mid-2000s, and how they are measured

	Chile	Uruguay	Bolivia	Brazil	Mexico
<i>Elite level</i>					
Persistent elite divide over regime issue?	To some extent ¹	No	No	No	No
New elite regime divide?	Yes, centering on executive prerogatives	No	No	Yes, centering on executive prerogatives	Yes, centering on executive prerogatives
Relationship old and new regime divide	Cross-cutting	–	–	Cross-cutting	Cross-cutting
<i>Mass level</i>					
Persistent mass divide over fundamental regime issues?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Elite dimension used to assess responsiveness	Old	Old	New ²	Old	Old

¹ The item whether democracy constitutes the best form of government is associated with the discriminant function centering on executive prerogatives, but the association is rather weak (0.30).

² The party system looks too different in 2005 to use old dimension. Party positions along the new regime divide (which is not statistically significant) is therefore employed to regress voter preferences along the mass regime divide, yielding high levels of responsiveness, as shown in Figure 8.

At the mass level, on the other hand, it is the classical regime divide from the immediate post-authoritarian period that sets electorates apart. In other words, although parties no longer nourish this conflict, it persistently shapes partisan alignments in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and

Mexico. Only in Brazil has the regime divide disappeared altogether. Given the strength of regime divides ten years earlier in Chile and Uruguay, the results are in line with expectations for these two cases. In the light of the relationship between regime and economic preferences, they also make sense for Mexico. The persistence of the classical regime divide (centering on democracy preference) in Bolivia is more surprising, on the other hand. The elite regime division that centers on executive prerogatives rather than clear-cut democratic-autocratic regime preferences is clearly subordinate to these more fundamental regime issues or even inexistent at the voter level.

To assess party system responsiveness along the regime dimension, we therefore cannot draw on the new regime divide (because it is largely irrelevant for voters), but instead have to draw on party positions along the old regime divide, observed ten years earlier. This allows for a test of the strength of the classical regime divide and the degree to which it still shapes partisan alignments. Figure 8 plots the results, comparing the regime and economic state-market divides for the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. Three trajectories are visible. The first is one in which the regime divide persists. It pertains first of all to the countries in which the economic and regime dimensions overlap significantly – Chile and Uruguay. The regime question, although pacified at the elite level, clearly continues to matter for voters. Albeit declining in strength in both countries, as expressed in the lower responsiveness measure in the 2000s as opposed to ten years earlier, the regime divide indeed remains more important than the economic dimension in Uruguay. In Chile, on the other hand, the economic dimension has partially compensated for the fading of the regime divide, contradicting those who postulate an uprooting of the Chilean party system (e.g., Bargsted and Somma 2016; Morgan and Meléndez 2017; Luna 2014).²² Again, Mexico approximates the two countries

²² Keep in mind, however, that the analysis only looks at respondents with a party preference. Given the declining levels of turnout in Chile (Carlin 2006, Morgan and Meléndez 2016), this leaves open the possibility that the party system is losing touch with certain groups in society.

with composite divides in that the regime dimension remains powerful – indeed, more powerful than the economic dimension.




Figure 8: Responsiveness Along the Economic and Regime Dimensions, Mid-1990s and Mid-2000s

The remaining two countries show diverging trajectories. In Brazil, responsiveness declines along both dimensions to the point that voter preferences no longer significantly predict the programmatic positions of parties in the 2006 elections (z-values below 1.96 are not statistically significant). The party system has become uprooted along both dimensions, and neither dimension has compensated for the waning of the other. Dealignment along the two main dimensions of conflict perhaps went hand in hand as parties failed to nurture their programmatic profiles and instead relied on performance evaluations (e.g., Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008).

Bolivia shows the opposite development: Responsiveness has increased along both dimensions.²³ While the party system was responsive only along the regime dimension after re-democratization, it has become highly representative of voter preferences along the economic state-market dimension as well. This evolution is partially due to the emergence of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, which now occupies the left-wing/pro-democratic terrain left vacant by MIR and CONDEPA (results not shown), and thus goes beyond the imprint of the regime divide. But arguably, by triggering the formation of ADN, the authoritarian regime strengthened the right, enabling a stronger differentiation of party platforms, which in turn nourished programmatic linkages.²⁴ This programmatic learning first occurred along the regime dimension, as we see in Figure 6 and 8, and then spread to the economic conflict. Bolivia and Chile are the two cases with responsive party systems in which the state-market divide is stronger than the regime divide.

Although the number of cases covered is limited, the trajectory of regime divides in the five countries tends to support the idea that regime divides are more persistent when they overlap with, rather than cross-cut the economic dimension. This pattern pertains to Chile,

23 Although the regime divide is measured in terms of executive prerogatives at the elite level and in terms of the more fundamental antagonism between democracy and authoritarianism at the voter level, party positions reflect voter preferences significantly (see Table 4).

24 For a discussion of the logic by which polarization leads to stronger programmatic alignments, see, e.g., Bornschier (2019) and Lupu (2015).

Uruguay, and Mexico. The overlapping character of a regime divide also opens opportunities for a reinvigoration of the economic cleavage, as we saw in Chile. Where regime and state-market conflicts are cross-cutting, the outcome seems to be more open: There is the possibility that both dimensions fade, as in Brazil, or that new actors reinvigorate competition along both dimensions, as in Bolivia.

Conclusion

The emergence of regime divides in several countries in South America that lived through authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s has made party systems on the continent more diverse. Whereas regime divides have introduced a two-dimensional policy space in some countries, the authoritarian legacy has failed to leave a lasting imprint in others. This paper has made a first step at theorizing and mapping out these differences. I started out by explaining where different mass-level orientations towards the authoritarian past and the new democratic regime are likely to manifest themselves politically, and where they are likely to remain dormant. In a nutshell, two paths lead to regime divides in the party system that reflect mass attitudes: One builds on ideational resources in terms of authoritarian regimes' economic policy heritage, and the other on organizational resources that allow actors to mobilize regime divides even in the absence of these favorable conditions.

Along the first path, the authoritarian regime's economic policy legacy makes the regime and economic divides overlap and reinforce one another. In this case, the left mobilizes pro-democratic citizens and the right rallies those who defend elements of the past authoritarian regime. This scenario was borne out in Chile and Uruguay. Mexico follows the same logic, except that the major pro-democratic party was market liberal and that pro-democratic attitudes go together with market liberal policy preferences. Although party systems in these

countries also feature parties that were born out of regime conflicts, new parties played only a minor role in triggering regime divides. The presence of PPD and UDI in Chile and PRD in Mexico was not a necessary condition for the manifestation of regime divides because the latter fit well into existing patterns of competition.

Where the regime and economic dimensions cross-cut each other more strongly, a regime dimension emerged only to the extent that the authoritarian regime fostered the formation of new political parties. For parties such as the PT and the PFL in Brazil, and ADN in Bolivia, a specific posture towards the outgoing regime is a defining element of their identity. Absent these two mechanisms, even where mass attitudinal differences in the assessment of a past authoritarian regime exist, they are unlikely to manifest themselves politically. This scenario occurred in Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru: These countries feature no clear elite regime divides. At the voter level, the situation is somewhat different in Peru and Argentina, but existing differences between electorates do not derive from the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s, but rather from more recent events.

In terms of the strength of regime divides, I expected the degree of cross-cuttingness to mitigate their strength. Conversely, overlapping regime and state-market divides structure voter alignments more strongly. The same logic is likely to govern the durability of regime divides. Of course, the historical strength of programmatic linkages may have predisposed Chilean and Uruguayan voters to align with parties along the regime dimension, but it is worth noting that this dimension became more powerful than the economic cleavage after re-democratization. This is unlikely to have been the case had the two dimensions not tended to reinforce each other. What is more, the regime divide remains powerful in Mexico, where economic conflict has been less intense, but where the two divides overlap as well.

Disagreement over the ideal type of regime evolves as democracy matures. Elites now disagree over the balance of power between executives and parliaments and over minority rights, rather than authoritarian alternatives to democracy. But for voters, the fundamental

regime question still matters, as my analysis showed, and the classical regime dimension shapes partisan alignments more strongly than these new issues. Whereas the classical regime dimension pits the left against the right, new issues introduce fissures within the left and the right blocks. Because old and new regime issues pull voters in different directions, regime questions are likely to retreat in importance in the future, unless they get re-invigorated by authoritarian tendencies as in Brazil. In the immediate post-authoritarian period, however, the regime dimension was important in fostering accountability and responsiveness even in adverse contexts such as Bolivia, as this paper has shown.

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Appendix A

Table A1: The Economic State-Market Dimension at the Party Level, Mid-1990s (Results of Canonical Linear Discriminant Analysis, first function reported)

Issue-items	Chile	Uruguay	Argentina	Peru	Brazil	Ecuador	Bolivia	Mexico
Privatize industry	-0.58	-0.35	-0.46	-0.63		-0.68	-0.35	-0.48
Privatize public services	-0.52	-0.35	-0.62	-0.75		-0.65	-0.82	-0.32
State resp.: - Price control	-0.33	-0.39	-0.49			-0.26	-0.64	-0.64
- Housing				-0.31				-0.48
- Jobs	-0.39	-0.37	-0.55					-0.51
- Soc. security	-0.41	-0.42						-0.53
- Unempl. benefits	-0.27	-0.63	-0.42	-0.31		-0.35		-0.41
- Basic needs	-0.33	-0.50	-0.26	-0.27		-0.32		-0.58
Free higher education	-0.54	-0.75	-0.83	-0.74		-0.34		-0.60
State vs. market scale*					1.00			
N	93	73	48	87	139	57	65	123
Canonical correlation	0.82	0.71	0.71	0.46	0.52	0.74	0.55	0.62
Eigenvalue	2.08	1.00	1.00	0.27	0.36	1.19	0.42	0.64
Prop. variance explained	87%	86%	87%	88%	100%	92%	78%	87%
p-value of F-statistic	0.0000	0.0003	0.0016	0.12	0.0000	0.0004	0.005	0.0000

Note: Results presented in this table are based on variables with imputed missing values. For imputation, I ran a prior Canonical linear discriminant analysis, and used only those variables with canonical structure coefficients of $|0.20|$ or higher and pointed in the expected direction. Consequently, the variables for which no canonical structure coefficients are shown in this table are those omitted from the analysis.

* Single economic item featured in the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS) from 1997.

Table A2: The Economic State-Market Dimension at the Voter Level, Mid-1990s (Results of Canonical Linear Discriminant Analysis, first function reported)

Issue-items	Chile	Uruguay	Argentina	Peru	Brazil	Ecuador	Bolivia	Mexico
<i>World Values Survey</i>								
Private or public ownership	0.45	-0.49	-0.46					1.00**
Competition good or bad	0.19	-0.34		-0.54				
Protectionism (limit imp.)		-0.44	-0.25	-0.69				
Income equality	0.89	-0.47	-0.29	-0.49				
Gov. should provide for all		-0.68	-0.91					
<i>Latinobarómetro 1995</i>								
State intervention scale								
Privatize					0.80			
Distribution of wealth					0.68			
<i>Latinobarómetro 1996</i>								
State resp.: - Jobs						-0.33	-0.64	
- Health care						-0.99	-0.42	
- Elderly								
- Unemployed						-0.34	-0.86	
- Reduce inequality						-0.20	-0.27	
-								
N	532	997	574	669	481	764	390	1968
Canonical correlation	0.18	0.26	0.11	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.14
Eigenvalue	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02
Prop. variance explained	69%	88%	68%	55%	87%	78%	67%	100#
p-value of F-statistic	0.009	0.0000	0.21	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.32	0.0000
z-value	1.8	5.8	2.0	0.0	2.6	-1.8	-0.2	1.4

Note: Results presented in this table are based on variables with imputed missing values. For imputation, I ran a prior Canonical linear discriminant analysis, and used only those variables with canonical structure coefficients of |0.20| or higher and pointed in the expected direction. Consequently, the variables for which no canonical structure coefficients are shown in this table are those omitted from the analysis.

* Solution is unidimensional.

** Single item makes up to first discriminant function after omitting variables with loadings below |0.20|.

Singe dimension revealed

Appendix B

Measurement of the regime dimension in Peru, mid-1990s

As explained in the main text, the Peruvian case proves difficult to assess because the analysis of its regime dimension is confounded by Alberto Fujimori's 1992 autogolpe. Looking at the party positions in the mid-1990s – shown on the upper dimension in Figure A1 – we see that parties differ considerably in terms of their regime posture (although the discriminant function does not reach statistical significance). The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) and Unión por el Perú (UPP) are set apart from “Cambio '90-New Majority”, the vehicle whereby Alberto Fujimori gained the presidency. This configuration might have been expected after Alberto Fujimori's 1992 autogolpe. At the mass level, however – shown as the lower dimension in Figure A1 – the strong regime divide that we saw in Table 3 turns out to be driven less by the relationship to Fujimori, but by more complex divisions among voters. In fact, the regime divide sets APRA and UPP voters apart from those supporting the left-wing Izquierda Unida (IU) and the right-wing Acción Popular (AP), while Fujimori's voters occupy an indeterminate position at the center of the regime divide. In part, these positions reflect the bitter infights within the left over democracy described by Roberts (1998, especially chap. 7). Although the responsiveness measure indicates a fairly strong relationship between voter preferences and party positions, the regime divide in the Peruvian case differs in idiosyncratic ways from that found elsewhere. As in the Argentine case, it seems safe to say that the regime divide in Peru is not a product of military rule in the 1970s.




Figure A1: Peru – Parties and Voters on the Regime Divide, 1995 Elections

Legend: APRA, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana; UPP, Unión por el Perú; CAMBIO90nm, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría; PP, Perú Posible (Alejandro Toledo); IU, Izquierda Unida; AP, Acción Popular.

Note: Lines below positions indicate standard deviations.